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I. INTRODUCTION
I will begin with my conclusion. The title to this Article—Embracing
Risk, Sharing Responsibility—is the way that I would revise the Embracing
Risk thesis after 9/11, Iraq, and Katrina.
This statement is, I hope, somewhat enigmatic. Like a Zen koan, it is
not supposed to be immediately and intuitively understandable. Instead, it
is supposed to point the way toward a new understanding and, afterwards,
to serve as a mental hook for that understanding. A real Zen koan is
supposed to point the way to enlightenment. I am not that ambitious. I
will be happy if by the end of the Article you will understand what the title
means.
II. NOT JUST EMBRACING RISK
The book to which the title refers, Embracing Risk, is a collection of
essays written by historians, sociologists, and lawyers who are nontraditional students of risk that Jonathan Simon and I finished editing in
2001, shortly before 9/11. In the first chapter, we pulled together some of
the strands from the essays in the book, along with our own observations,
to make the following claim:
†
Adapted from a speech given at the Risk and Responsibility Symposium,
Drake University Law School, Sept. 7, 2007.
*
Connecticut Mutual Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. This
Article is a revised and updated version of an address given in the spring of 2002 and
published as: Liability and Insurance After September 11th: Embracing Risk Meets the
Precautionary Principle, 27 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 342 (2002).
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Western Society is “embracing risk” in two distinct senses.
First, people increasingly use concepts of risk to describe and manage
social problems. As we wrote, “money management, social services,
policing, environmental policy, tort law, national defense, and a host of
otherwise unrelated fields have all come to share a common vocabulary of
risk.” 1 This aspect of the embracing risk thesis is unassailable. Later
events only strengthen the claim. September 11 raised the profile of the
risk of terrorism. The Bush Administration told us we needed to go to war
in Iraq because of the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction. Katrina
put catastrophic risk on the national agenda.
Second, Western society has not only embraced risk as a useful
conceptual framework, but has also embraced risk as a matter of social
policy. Governments, large employers, and other big institutions that used
to spread risks are encouraging and sometimes requiring individuals to
embrace the actual risks that they encounter in their lives. Across Western
society, governments and other big institutions are to a degree cutting
people loose from social structures that spread risk, exposing individuals to
more risk, making them more individually responsible—all in the name of
creating a more dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative society.
This second sense of embracing risk is more controversial. The core
idea here is the recognition that too much protection against loss can
produce too much loss. Not all risks should be spread. For their own and
society’s good, individuals should embrace some risks. As we wrote, “as
more of life is understood in terms of risk, taking risks increasingly
becomes what one does with risk.” 2
Here are three examples of this kind of embracing risk phenomena in
the United States context. First is the shift from a “defined benefit”
approach to a “defined contribution” approach for employment based
insurance. With defined benefits the employer guarantees the employee a
specific retirement and health benefit. With defined contribution, the
employer provides the employee with a specific amount of money and
leaves the employee with the responsibility of investing funds for
retirement and the selection of health benefits. Second is the proposed
shift in Social Security retirement benefits in which individuals will have a

1.
Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK:
THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (Tom Baker &
Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
2.
Id.
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similar amount of control over a portion of the Social Security taxes they
pay. Third, and most important is the redesign of private and social
welfare benefits to encourage individuals to use fewer benefits, to go back
to work sooner, and in general to place fewer demand on social resources.
This redesign happened to welfare benefits in the United States as
epitomized in the renaming of Aid to Families With Dependent Children
to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. 3 It happened to workers’
compensation benefits, which were consciously cut so that people would
stay out of work for shorter periods. It also happened to health insurance,
with the increase in out of pocket payments, the rise of medical savings
accounts and the call for consumer directed healthcare. Indeed, some
people advocate what amounts to defined contribution health benefits:
health savings accounts. In each of these examples, we ask individuals to
take more risk—investment risk, income risk, health cost risk—to reduce
the demand on social resources.
This “taking risks” aspect of embracing risk is what events like 9/11,
Iraq, and Hurricane Katrina suggest we should reconsider. Taking risks
does not sound like a very good approach to terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, or natural disasters.
Seven years after finishing Embracing Risk, I stand by the descriptive
accuracy of our story. In all the ways that we described, people are being
encouraged or forced to take more risk. What I am not ready to stand
behind is the implicit message that the taking risks aspect of embracing risk
is almost always and almost everywhere a good thing. Not quite.
Before explaining how I would refine the embracing risk thesis today,
I would like to spend a few minutes on the spreading risk paradigm to
which embracing risk is a reaction.
After all, leaders all over the West did not just wake up from a
collective dream and say, “Now we should embrace risk.” Instead, they
were reacting to a century long encounter with a very different paradigm—
spreading risk. To understand the limits of embracing risk, we need to
consider that history.
III. FROM SPREADING RISK TO EMBRACING RISK
When future historians reflect on the developments that transformed
3.
United States Department of Health & Human Services, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/abbrev/afdctanf.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
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the world during the 100 years between 1890 and 1990, they are of course
going to emphasize the internal combustion engine, the telephone,
airplanes, nuclear weapons, and the computer, but they are also going to
emphasize insurance.
Insurance was not invented in the twentieth century, but the history
of the twentieth century is one in which insurance institutions protected
more and more people from more and more kinds of risk. Pick almost any
kind of private or social insurance in almost any developed country and
one will find, well into the late twentieth century, a steady expansion in the
degree of protection that insurance provided.
The West never approached the frictionless, complete insurance of
economists’ theoretical model, but each kind of insurance became more
“complete” in at least three senses. First, it protected a steadily increasing
percentage of the population. Second, it protected that population against
an increasingly broad range of risks. Finally, it provided compensation for
an increasingly large fraction of an insured loss. While of course there
were people and risks left out, domestic social policy of the West for most
of the twentieth century could be summed up in the phrase: “More
insurance for more people.”
Of course anyone transported from 1890 to 1990 would have been
utterly amazed by the phones, planes, cars, medicines, and overall
opulence. They also would have been nearly as amazed by the degree to
which ordinary workers were protected from the hard corners of life. This
protection comes from what Francois Ewald has praised, and others have
decried, as the “insurance state”—an approach to governing in which the
main objective of government is protecting citizens from risk.
A passage from a nineteenth century essay written by a FrenchAmerican lawyer named Jacques best illustrates the term “insurance state.”
The essay is called Society on the Basis of Mutual Life Insurance, and it
appeared in a prominent business journal in 1849. 4 Keep in mind that
date—1849 was before railroads, before the Civil War, but at an explosive
point in the second Industrial Revolution
Consciously written
influenced the young Karl
brotherhood and security
means of production, but

against the French socialists who had so
Marx, Jacques’ essay imagines a world in which
come, not through collective ownership of the
rather through institutions that protect against

4.
D.R. Jacques, Society on the Basis of Mutual Life Insurance, 16 HUNT’S
MAG. & COM. REV. 152 (1849).
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the inevitable misfortunes of industrial society.
Jacques imagined a society on the basis of mutual life insurance that,
unlike Marx’s communism, would not require revolutionary changes in the
ownership or control of private property. What this new society would
require was only the expansion of insurance beyond the narrow confines of
marine, fire and life insurance.
Jacques wrote:
Insurance . . . takes from all a contribution; from those who will not
need its aid, as well as from those who will . . . . But as it is uncertain
who will, and who will not, it demands this tribute from all to the
uncertainty of fate. And it is precisely the moneys thus given away by
some, and these only, which supply the fund out of which the
misfortunes of those whose bad luck it is that their moneys have not
been thrown away, are repaired. . . . From this point of view the whole
beauty of the system of insurance is seen. It is from this point of view
that it presents society a union for mutual aid, of the fortunate and
unfortunate, where those only who need it receive aid, and those only
who can afford it are put to expense. Thus, while the aggregate of
human suffering and calamity remains undiminished—thus, while the
uncertainty of their visitation remains unremoved—human ingenuity
and co-operation equalize the distribution of this fearful aggregate,
and alleviate the terrors of uncertainty.
....
. . . By a system of mutual insurance thus generally established,
embracing all callings, a great fund, as it were, for the benefit of
society, would be created; a fund to which none could be said to
contribute gratuitously, from which none but the needy should be
aided; a great reserve fund, held in readiness for the uncertain case of
want. We thus have the mechanic, the laborer, and the merchant,
joined hand in hand in mutual protection against the risks of their
callings; we have the masses, above all, shielded from the most
blighting evil of the inequality of human condition, the danger of
destitution; we have society united on the basis of mutual insurance. 5

This is a far cry from Karl Marx’s slogans of the same era: “working
men of all countries unite” 6 and “[f]rom each according to his ability, to

5.
6.

Id. at 158.
KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 58
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each according to his needs.” 7
Looking back, it is very easy to see who had the better crystal ball.
Marx had quite a run, but Jacques’s idea of insurance was far more lasting.
The institutional structure of late twentieth century insurance institutions
was not that of mid-nineteenth century mutual life insurance companies.
For example, the government played a much larger role. But, the West is
far closer to a society united on the basis of mutual insurance than even
Jacques might have thought possible.
Yet, despite the successes of the insurance state, during the last two
or three decades of the twentieth century there grew an increasing
dissatisfaction with the call for “more insurance for more people.”
We discovered that the more people are protected from loss, the
more social resources are consumed by loss—this is the crisis of the welfare
state that led to the “third way” and the “end of welfare as we know it” and
that explains why people were ready to believe that compassionate
conservatism meant something more than protecting the haves and the
have mores.
This discovery was not really new. People in the early nineteenth
century insurance industry worried about “moral hazard,” just as the
authors of the poor laws worried about the related problem of
“pauperization.” But, historically, moral hazard and pauperization were
localized concerns. What was new was the widespread recognition that
moral hazard is a systemic problem embedded in the foundations of the
insurance state.
Insurance cannot spread all losses because some losses grow with the
insurance. Not dollar for dollar, but over time they grow enough to reduce
our willingness, and maybe even our ability, to keep spreading them.
The obvious example in the United States today is Medicare. We are
keeping our head above water for now—in large part because of all the
young immigrants who pay taxes—but the trajectory is not good. I will be
happy when we get to the point when Medicare funding ranks higher on
the public agenda than Iraq, but when that happens, things are not going to
be pretty for the healthcare industry.
The embracing risk paradigm grew in large part out of this decline in
(ElecBook London 1998) (1848).
7.
KARL MARX, CRITIQUE
(1875).

OF THE

GOTHA PROGRAM 20 (ElecBook 2001)
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the belief in the risk spreading power of large institutions, but it also grew
out of a desire for individual control and autonomy. Think of Nike’s “Just
Do It,” McDonald’s “Your Way,” and the Army’s “An Army of One.” On
this point, be sure to read Jonathan Simon’s essay in the book about
mountain climbing, which illustrates the appeal of taking risks. 8
Looking back at our book seven years later, I have the following
reaction: I think we over-emphasized the limits on insurance institutions’
ability to spread risk. We did not emphasize enough the negative
consequences of taking risks, especially when people do not choose to do
so. We also did not emphasize enough the degree to which the embracing
risk paradigm threatens the social glue that holds our society together.
Although the United States is supposed to be the land of the free and
the brave—the rugged, competitive individual who rejects solidarity—in
fact, the enormous public and private insurance institutions built over the
last 100 years represent a tremendous social commitment to solidarity. The
solidarities in many cases are narrower than they might be, and typically
they are the collective result of relatively autonomous individuals acting in
their self-interest rather than an expression of fraternal responsibility, but
they are solidarities nonetheless.
Embracing risk threatens to break apart these huge insurance pools
so that the social policy of “more insurance for more people” becomes one
of “more insurance for some, but less for others.” More insurance for the
haves and the have mores, less insurance for everyone else.
Some embracing risk developments may be very beneficial, but the
embrace of risk can lead to competition on the basis of risk in which
insurance companies and even states compete by developing new ways to
identify “good” risks and shut out the “bad.” The increased emphasis on
risk-rating in health insurance and the corresponding decline in community
rating are both very real examples of the retreat from solidarity in the
United States health insurance market. The shift to defined contribution
health insurance benefits threatens to accelerate this de-pooling.
Embracing risk can be beneficial when it provides manageable
incentives to people who are in a position to control risk and prevent loss.
It is counterproductive when it becomes an excuse for leaving expensive
losses on people with little or no control over those losses. This is why
embracing some risks can be beneficial in health insurance design—for
8.
Jonathan Simon, Taking Risks: Extreme Sports and the Embrace of Risk
in Advanced Liberal Societies, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 1, at 177–202.
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example, higher co-pays for name brand drugs than generics—and why
embracing other risks is harmful—for example, making people with
chronic disease pay more than the healthy.
Along with embracing risk, we need to re-invigorate a forgotten
nineteenth century insurance idea—that of destructive competition. When
insurance companies compete by “cream-skimming” the good risks and
shutting out the bad risks, they destroy the safety net that insurance is
supposed to provide. Yes, not all risks are the same. No, the answer to
every potential loss is not the spreading risk approach of the past, but we
need to distinguish risks for the right reasons so we do not de-pool
ourselves out of the security net that has been one of the wonders of the
twentieth century. We need to recognize that competition on the basis of
risk selection, especially in personal lines of insurance and perhaps more
broadly, is destructive and often pernicious—except when risk
classification sends a useful signal that insureds can act upon to prevent
loss, to their benefit and society’s benefit.
Embracing risk need not and should not mean a retreat from the ideal
of protecting individuals from risk. It does mean recognizing that not all
risks are the same—some risks should not be fully shifted to the insurance
pool. At the same time, however, it demands that we carefully examine the
risk-based distinctions made in the insurance market so they do not result
in destructive competition. That is the biggest concern when reconsidering
embracing risk seven years later. Embrace risks when it is socially
responsible to do so. Spread risks over to areas in which people do not
have control, and do not leave it only to the market to sort that out.
Reconsideration number two relates to the big problem that
Embracing Risk mostly ignored:
catastrophic risk.
We ignored
catastrophic risk because it did not fit easily into the embracing risk
paradigm. Like embracing risk, catastrophic risk poses a challenge to the
spreading risk paradigm, but it is a different challenge. Embracing risk
says that we cannot spread all risks because the losses will increase with the
insurance. Catastrophic risk challenges the spreading paradigm in a
different way. With embracing risk we run away from insurance; with
catastrophic risk, the insurance runs away from us. Insurance companies
say that they cannot deal with catastrophic risk, not because people take
advantage—though sometimes of course they do—but because insurance
companies do not know how to price it. If they cannot price it, they cannot
sell it, and if they cannot sell it, we cannot spread the risk. What does
embracing risk have to say to that problem?
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I have an answer, and like many of the answers in our book, it is
based on history. Looking back at insurance history, we can see that the
catastrophic risk problem is based on a false premise. That premise is
based on the idea that we can only spread risk if we can predict it in
advance. It is also based on the premise that insurance requires fixed
premiums paid in advance. But if we look back at insurance history, we
can see plenty of examples of insurance against losses that the insurers
could not predict in advance, and those kinds of insurance did not involve
fixed premiums paid in advance.
Insurance history is full of what people in the insurance trade call
assessment insurance. With assessment insurance, the insurer does its best
to calculate the correct premium in advance, but it has the ability to come
back and collect more after a loss to help people who need it if the
insurance fund runs dry. The amount that the insurer can collect after the
fact from any one person is calculated based on the chance that this person
would have been among those who suffered the loss and based on the
amount of loss that this person would have suffered. The assessment
approach recognizes that, “there but for the grace of God go I.” That we
are all in this together.
With an assessment approach to insurance, you do not need to know
in advance the amount of future loss. The assessment approach to
insurance is tailor-made for the uncertainties of catastrophic risk. We need
to embrace catastrophic risk, not as rugged individuals turning our homes
into concrete bunkers mounted on stilts—though a little of that would be a
good thing—but rather as a society, maybe even as a nation.
Embrace risk, share responsibility, take the leap into the unknown of
catastrophic risk, but take that leap linked together. It is trite and clichéd I
know, but “United we stand; divided we fall.”
IV. CONCLUSION
As Francois Ewald states in his wonderful essay at the end of
Embracing Risk, “we are seeing the birth of a new paradigm, one that has
not yet found its true name, but whose arrival is presaged by various
signs.” 9 The only question is how insurance institutions will adapt. I have
tried to suggest that insurance institutions should adapt in two
complementary ways that are summed up in the phrase, “embracing risk,

9.
Francis Ewald, The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An Outline
of a Philosophy of Precaution, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 1, at 273.
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sharing responsibility.”
First, insurance institutions should adapt to increase the incentives for
individuals and institutions to prevent harm. That is the embracing risk
part. But at the same time, we need to work together—through
government regulation—to prevent the destructive competition and depooling that will otherwise result. That is the sharing responsibility part.
Second, insurance institutions need to adapt to provide coverage for
unpredictable, catastrophic risk. In other words, insurance institutions
need to embrace catastrophic risk. That is the embracing risk part. We
also need to increase the ability of our insurance system to make
assessments. That is the sharing responsibility part. The assessment
element can come in the form of a government backstop or perhaps it will
come in more creative ways that lawyers and policymakers will invent.
Embrace risk, but share responsibility. That is my vision for risk and
insurance in the twenty-first century.

